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Truth, Sir, is a cow that will yield such people
no more milk, and so they are gone to milk the bull.
Samuel Johnson'
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, embarking on a powerful critique of John
Stuart Mill, says: "In stating the grounds of one's dissent from wide-spread and
influential opinions it is absolutely necessary to take some definite statement
of those opinions as a starting point, and it is natural to take the ablest, the
most reasonable, and the clearest."2 This is my justification for reviewing the
present work. My disagreement with it is broad and deep, but, unlike many
proponents of similar views, Professor Benson writes clearly and without
jargon, and he brings to his work the experience of a working lawyer and a
teacher of working lawyers. He presents his doctrine in such a way that one
can profitably engage with it.
That doctrine is in the end postmodem. Benson gets there in three steps. He
begins with what he calls the Old Story, which is founded on the idea that "the
law is in the text" (6). In addition to statutes, judicial decisions, and the like,
he characterizes as texts all the transcendent values to which people have
looked in the adjudicative process, whether they are written in people's hearts
as natural law, or written on stone or parchment as the Hebrew Scriptures are.
Wherever the texts come from, the adjudicative task, according to the Old
Story, is the same. It is "to discover the meaning placed in the text by the
author" (7).
At this point, Benson drops his consideration of unwritten texts, and
addresses the principles offered by the Old Story for the interpretation of
statutes, constitutions, contracts and the like on the one hand, judicial
precedents on the other. He takes up four rules for the interpretation of the first
category--"texts that attempt to guide future conduct" (8). These are:
1. Boswell's Life ofJohnson, Thursday, 21 July, 1763 (London: Oxford University Press,
1953; 3d ed. orig. pub. 1799), 314.
2. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, ed. R.J. White (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991; 2d ed. orig. pub. 1874), 54.
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1. "Follow the plain meaning of the words" (8-10).
2. "If the words are ambiguous, apply intrinsic canons (rules) of
construction that help clarify the internal workings of the language or
the law" (11-12).
3. "If ambiguity persists, look for extrinsic evidence of the purpose the
authors intended" (12-16).
4. "Always be certain that your interpretation is reasonable"(16-18).
Benson then offers three rules for the interpretation of judicial precedents:
1. "Separate the precedent case into its basic elements: Facts, Procedural
History, Issue, Holding, and Reasoning" (19-20).
2. "Focus on the holding (the ratio decidendi, deciding reason, or ground
of decision) of the case, and exclude the incidental remarks (obiter
dicta) made by the judge" (20).
3. "Reasoning by analogy, show how the case at hand is either similar to
or distinguishable from the precedent case, and therefore either is or
is not controlled by its holding" (21).
These principles are all familiar enough, and Benson presents them as
straightforwardly as one could wish before proceeding to deconstruct them.
He carries out the deconstruction in a chapter called "The Modem Story,"
in which he refutes all the rules of interpretation that he described in the
previous chapter:
1. "There can be no rule that plain meanings must be followed, because
words have no plain meanings" (33-37). Words are constantly
changing their meanings in accordance with the context in which they
are used, or in accordance with changes in the culture.
2. "The intrinsic canons of construction are too contradictory and
enigmatic to be called rules, and are ignored as often as they are used"
(37-41). Benson (giving due credit to Karl Llewellyn) supports his
claim with a tabular presentation of fifteen familiar canons, each with
a quotation from a court that has declined to apply it.
3. "Extrinsic evidence of intended purpose cannot constrain interpreters
because the evidence is limitless, manipulable, and unordered, and
because 'intended purpose' is usually a fiction anyway" (41-51).
4. "By making 'reasonableness' its ultimate requirement, the Old Story
quietly welcomes subjectivity after all. Moreover, the doctrines sup-
posedly promoting rationality are fantasies" (55-57). Here Benson
argues that the appeal to any transcendent rationality is hopelessly out
of date:
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With modernism, the immutable sources disappear. Holmes could
finally proclaim that "the common law is not a brooding omnipresence
in the sky" because reason was no longer a brooding omnipresence in
the sky either. The pulse of reason beats within the law only to the
rhythm of our own hearts. And one person does not march to the same
beat as the next. (55)
Having disposed of the rules of interpretation of statutes, contracts, and the
like, Benson goes on to say that "There are no Meaningful Rules for Finding
the Meaning in the Texts of Judicial Precedents"(58-62). He shows this largely
by raising the familiar objections to Langdell's "scientific" approach to case
analysis, and applying them to all claims that judges are constrained by stare
decisis, and indeed to all claims that law can be taught through case analysis:
"The case method of pedagogy gave the law schools and practicing lawyers
protected marketplace niches, but at the cost of making American law students,
professors, lawyers, and judges Langdell's prisoners. They are its prisoners
even today..." (59).
Benson follows his account of the Modern Story with a chapter on "The
Postmodern Insight," evidently intended to provide a context for his detailed
critique of the Old Story, and an alternative way of dealing with legal texts. He
begins with this description of the insight:
The postmodern insight is that the meaning of anything-language, history,
science, a painting, a building, a poem, a novel, a law-is assembled by the
humans who attempt to understand it, from complex component parts which can
always be shattered and reassembled different ways into different meanings, like
a collage. Every new assembly is an interpretation of the components, which
gives them meaning. And since each of us always views our world from the
standpoint of some assembled interpretation in our own heads, there is no
external, objective standpoint from which to view any other, no single "tue" or
"best" collage. (67-68)
But we are not free to interpret any way we please, because we belong to
"interpretive communities" (term taken from Stanley Fish) (74), which attach
"if not an objective, at least an intersubjective meaning which acquires a
privilege" (quoting Umberto Eco) (74). Benson accepts that the law is such an
interpretive community. All he seeks to do is free that community from the
restraint of objective standards external to itself.
In subsequent chapters, Benson shows how his insights affect real or
hypothetical cases. He shows that a stop sign cannot always mean to stop,
because there are some situations-say you are running from a flash flood-in
which you will not be expected to stop He shows that the 55 mph speed limit
2008
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that Congress imposed on the States between 1974 and 1995 was not really a
55 mph speed limit because it was seldom enforced. He gives a fairly detailed
examination of the prevailing opinions in Brown v. Board of Education and
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad to show that considerations other than those
projected by the Old Story entered into the judges' choice of texts and
therefore into their decisions.
As an unreconstructed adherent of the Old Story, what can I say about this
concerted and vigorous attack on it? Let me begin with the propositions I have
quoted from Benson's second chapter, for they are the foundation of his
critique. First, is it in fact the case that words have no plain meanings? I
submit that it is not. There are many words that refer to specific things or
classes of things, and everybody who hears them knows the things or classes
to which they refer. Benson seems to think that this claim is refuted by the fact
that words have different meanings in different contexts, but I cannot see that
it is. I am the holder of a chair in my University. When I go to a committee
meeting, I find a person called a chair presiding over it. I sit in a chair to
participate. This does not show that the word "chair" has no plain meaning. It
shows that it has three meanings, all of them plain. Everyone understands these
meanings.' No one supposes that I am sitting in the endowments by which my
salary is paid, or that the object in which I am sitting is presiding over the
meeting.6 Reality is presenting us with three distinct objects, one physical and
inanimate, one human, and one abstract. Since they all exist, it is appropriate
to use words to refer to them, and that is what we do, extending metaphorically
the word for a concrete object because that is easier than coining new words.
Or supposing I go to my sink and turn on a tap marked "C." If I am in the
United States, I will get cold water. If I am in France, and the hot water heater
is working, I will get hot water. Does it follow that the letters on taps have no
plain meaning or that the distinction between hot and cold is a social
construct? I submit that it does not.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
5. To be sure, "everyone" here is limited to speakers of English who are acquainted with
committee meetings and endowed professorships. But it does not follow, as Benson says it does,
that "It is misleading... to think of words as labels for anything" (35). Rather, the fact that it
takes some acquaintance with an object to understand a word referring to that object bespeaks
exactly the relation between word and object that is indicated by calling the word a "label." Nor
is the English word any less a label because other languages may connect different words to the
same object. I have had the experience of pointing at an object and asking and being told the
word for that object in another language. The word I was given was a label too.
6. To be sure, if someone at the committee meeting were to say that I should give up my
chair to a colleague, there might be a momentary misunderstanding, but it would be quickly
cleared up.
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Benson supports his attack on the Plain Meaning Rule by showing that there
are cases in which a motorist will not be expected to stop at a stop sign, and
that there were many places in which the 55 mph speed limit was not enforced.
Here, he conflates the view-which nobody doubts-that the law is not
contained within its written texts with the view that the texts have no intrinsic
meaning. It seems to me that when I fail to stop at a stop sign (I generally have
worse excuses than running from a flash flood) it is not that I am not aware
that the sign says to stop. It is just that I decide not to do what the sign says.
There is a classic doctrine called epikeia (or epieikeia) that limits the
application of legal rules.7 The word is sometimes translated as "equity," but
it has also a flavor of common sense. The classic example was the rule that the
city gates were to be shut at sundown. On this particular day the country is
being invaded. At sundown, the inhabitants are fleeing to the city for
protection, and the defending troops are coming into the city to take up
positions on the walls. We do not shut the gates.8 But epikeia is not a principle
of interpretation. When we leave the gates open, we are not interpreting the
rule; we are deciding not to follow it.
Look next at Benson's attack on rules of construction. If they purported to
be rules of law in the sense that statutes or judicial pronouncements are rules
of law, he would be quite right to attack them as he does. In fact, though, they
have never purported to be that. They are maxims, rules of thumb, bits of
common sense like "early to bed, early to rise," "don't spit to windward," or
"measure twice, cut once." They are the product of many generations'
experience of people trying to understand other people's normative language.
No one has ever supposed them to be normative language in their own right.
When it comes to interpreting a piece of language in the light of the
intention behind it, Benson impermissibly confuses finis operis, the purpose
of the work, withfinis operands, the purpose of the worker. The impossibility
of arriving at the latter-which is what Benson effectively points out-has no
effect on the possibility of arriving at the former. When I see, say, a medieval
shoe, I do not have to probe the psychology of the cobbler to know that what
it is for is to be put on someone's foot. Similarly, when I see a medieval
statute, say Quia Emptores, 9 I do not have to probe the mental processes of
King, Lords, or Commons to know that what it was for was to stop
subinfeudation.
7. See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Classic Problems of Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: Carolina
Academic Press, 2005), 61-63.
8. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 96, a. 6; and 2-2, q. 120.
9. 16 Edw. 1, stat. 1 (1290).
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I might of course go on and ask what was wrong with subinfeudation. I
could get some idea from the Preamble to the Act, and get more of an idea by
reading T.F.T. Plucknett's Legislation ofEdward.l° I would still not be inside
anybody's head; I would simply be looking at what was going on in the
society into which the statute was introduced. The possibility of examining
questions of this kind is reflected in the so-called Mischief Rule, which calls
in some cases for limiting or extending the operation of a statute in the light
of the problem with which it was meant to deal." For instance, a statute that
forbade the prevailing litigant to give "food and drink" to the jurors in a case
was extended to forbid giving them cigars. 2 And a statute requiring a train to
stop if an "animal or obstruction" appeared on the tracks was held not to apply
to a goose because a goose could not derail the train. ' 3 In such cases, we can
discern the purpose of a statute without any regard to the motivation of the
legislators.
Such discernment, of course, is based on reason, which Benson
characterizes as the Old Story's fallback position. His attack on that position
is based on the fairly obvious fact that people do not all reason alike: "the
standard of reason is inevitably subjective: one interpreter's rationality may be
another's absurdity" (57). He supports his claim with two cases, neither of
which supports it. In each of them, the dissent is appealing to reason while the
prevailing opinion is appealing to something else. 4
In any event, the fact that people disagree on a question does not necessarily
mean that the answer is subjective. As Alexander Pope says, "'Tis with our
judgments as our watches, none go just alike, yet each believes his own."' 5 But
there is still a right time. There are all kinds of questions on which people can
disagree without calling into question either their methodology or their
10. T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of EdwardI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 102-8.
11. See Heydon's Case, 3 Co.Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exch. 1584).
12. Bakery. Jacobs, 23 A. 588 (Vt. 1891).
13. Nashville & KR. Co. V. Davis, 76 S.W. 1050 (Tenn. 1902).
14. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Chief Justice Burger explicitly disclaimed any use
of his own standards of reasonableness:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our constitutional system the commitment
to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action
by judicially decreeing what accords with "common sense and the public weal." Our
Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.
In Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Justice Black, for the majority, simply refused to
second guess the military authorities:"We cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm
perspective of hindsight--now say that at that time these actions were unjustified."
15. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, stanza 2 (1711), reprinted in Pastoral Poetry
& an Essay on Criticism, ed. E. Audra and Aubrey Williams (London: Methuen and Co., 196 1),
239-40.
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objectivity. I saw a documentary on television the other night in which
different anthropologists were expressing different opinions as to whether
Neanderthals interbred with Cro-Magnons. Debatable as the question is, one
of the proposed answers must be right and the other wrong. Questions of what
decision in a case is reasonable may also be debatable and still have
objectively right answers.
When it comes to judicial precedents, Benson makes a strawman of
Langdell. He characterizes "the Old Story's claim about precedent" as being,
"that the texts of prior cases themselves control judicial behavior" (5 8-59). It
may be that Langdell extracted rules in this way from case reports and applied
them as if some legislature had enacted them, 6 but I doubt if anyone else did.
For most lawyers, in Langdell's day as in our own, a case report is a story
about a problem that someone brought before ajudge or a bench ofjudges, and
how the judge or judges drew on available legal materials to solve it. Stare
decisis, then, is simply a matter of treating similar problems in similar ways.
In fact, Benson ends his critique of stare decisis by saying, "My objections to
the Old Story's version of stare decisis aren't recommendations for reform,
they're descriptions of what we've already got" (62). I question whether
anybody, with the possible exception of Langdell, ever thought we had
anything else.
I think that where Benson really differs from the Old Story-and from
me-regarding precedent is in the extent to which the whole narrative of a
prior case constrains or ought to constrain ajudge deciding a subsequent case.
Adherents of the Old Story tend to believe, as do I, in a certain historical
continuity in the ongoing life of a community and in people's aspiration to
deal justly with one another. The development of judicial precedent is a part
of that historical continuity, and the judges of every generation are called to
carry it on rather than return it to square one and start over.
Benson completes his argument by taking up Brown v. Board ofEducation7
and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.8 In dealing with Brown, he examines
carefully the intellectual formation of all the justices, their racial attitudes, the
internal politics of the Court, and the justices' perception of the state of public
feeling in the South. He argues that the justices took all these considerations
into account in making their decision, and should have been more upfront
about doing so. He pays no attention at all to what seem to me (as an adherent
16. The excerpt in the casebook, George C. Christie and Patrick H. Martin, Jurisprudence,
3d ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West 2008), 759-60, certainly supports that interpretation of
Langdell's approach. But see Bruce A. Kibmall, "Langdell on Contracts and Legal Reasoning:
Correcting the Holmesian Caricature," Law and History Review 25 (2007): 345.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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of the Old Story with a bit of Natural Law thrown in) to be the most important
points behind the decision: (1) That Plessy v. Ferguson, the case first
upholding segregation, was an abomination from the start, and should have
been overruled for the reasons stated by Justice Harlan in his dissent, and (2)
That everyone in the United States knew that segregation of the races was put
in place by whites who thought blacks were inferior and wanted to keep them
that way. The Old Story as I tell it would have supported bringing these points
to the analysis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and deciding the case
accordingly. "
Benson begins his discussion of Palsgraf with the intellectual and social
formation of Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, who wrote the opinion. That done,
he turns to the "texts" on which Cardozo drew for his opinion. He shows that
none of those texts was irresistibly dispositive of the case, and tells us that we
should stop hunting for texts in cases like this and simply bring our values,
whatever they are, to the table. Here, in my opinion, he betrays a serious
misunderstanding of stare decisis. Cardozo was a great common law judge,
and he did what great common law judges do. What great common law judges
do is not combing through old cases for Langdellian texts to apply to the case
before them. They look at the whole body of precedent as an artifact that
generations of their predecessors have been at work building, and to which
they can add a little on occasion. Palsgraf is one of a series of cases in which
Cardozo elaborated, refined, and extended the doctrine that people who put
other people at risk should compensate for the ensuing harm.20
I find this doctrine morally persuasive, and, in Cardozo's hands, legally
elegant. It is of course quite possible to disagree with it. Judge Andrews,
dissenting in Palsgraf itself, argues that people should be liable, within
basically arbitrary limits of time and place, for all the consequences of their
negligent acts. Professor (later Judge) John Noonan suggests that Cardozo
loses sight of the humanity of the victims of the accident, and that it might be
better to make common carriers liable for all injuries to passengers on their
premises.2" Both these approaches involve values, and they both have some
support in the structure of legal precedent that was before the court when it
decided Palsgraf Benson accuses Cardozo of "hiding the choices of values
being made,"(137) but Cardozo's articulation of risk doctrine looks like a
choice of values to me, and he does not hide it at all. Benson thinks that
19. Here I differ both from the Court and from Benson's version (120-2 1) of what "a more
candid Court might have said."
20. See Warren A. Seavey, "Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts," Columbia Law
Review 39 (1939): 20-52.
21. John T. Noonan, Jr., "The Passengers of Palsgraf" in Persons and Masks ofthe Law
(New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1976), 111-51.
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Andrews was "more honest," (13 7) but Andrews's opinion22 exhibits the same
kind of reasoning as other opinions do. He uses more hypotheticals and fewer
decided cases than Cardozo does, but he does use cases, and gives a particular
accolade to Lord Scrutton's decision in the Polemis case23, which is almost as
famous as Palsgraf.
Much of Benson's project is founded on the "postmodern insight" to which
he devotes a chapter, and much of my criticism of the project entails a
criticism of that insight. I continue to insist on the basic coherence of reality.
We are able to understand reality, to make laws about it, and to decide cases
according to them after we have made them, because reality presents itself to
us in intelligible categories, elements of an intelligible design. The necessary
understanding does not come easily because our hearts, our minds, and our
languages are inadequate to the task. Thought is inadequate to reality, and
language is inadequate to thought. But addressing reality with the tools at our
disposal is the human condition. This side of the eschaton, full understanding
will elude us. But if we keep working together at it, building on what our
predecessors have accomplished, as common law judges do, we can come by
valuable understandings of what we are about, and even hope to see a given
reality improved in some way by our efforts. Benson's postmodern insight is
aptly stated in his collage metaphor. But what we really have are the pieces of
a jigsaw puzzle. It is not always easy to fit the pieces together, but we should
not instead be making them into collages.
22. 162 N.E. at 101.
23. [1921] 3 K.B. 560, referred to 162 N.E.103.
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